(Italics mine)Jin+Guice wrote: ↑Mon Jan 27, 2025 3:29 pmWhat I find interesting about post-modernism is its ability to go beyond the cold hard realities of modernism. Imo, runaway modernism is how you end up with consumerism, more for the sake of more, and institutions and technologies which service the idea of technological and economic progress while ignoring the human and environmental costs. If the true purpose of progress is supposedly to improve the human condition, then is it not eventually subjective experience that matters above objective metrics?
I think biomedical science offers an interesting case study, because there are ways in which 1) it operates, and 2) the public understands it, which kind of smear across the 'isms'. In particular: how it is funded, and what is considered progress.
It is true that large biotech companies do have substantial research budgets, but a huge chunk of funding of biomedical research (in the US) comes from public grants (i.e. the National Institutes of Health, in large part). Grant-writing to get this research money is a dark art, and involves a decent dosage of technical feasibility combined with the potential of the research to benefit mankind. The technical, experimental design component is pretty "nuts and bolts". A reviewer might quibble here and there as to whether a methodology is better or worse, but there isn't that much subjectivity involved (but humans gonna human...). Now, whether the potential of the research is enough, or a priority, or worth spending $600k dollars on (a typical size grant)...well, that is indeed subjective. Especially considering that funding one grant means turning down another (with it's own potential benefits). And yet, what is considered progress (by the public's standards, but also sometimes institutions as well) has more to do with outcome (e.g. whether a pill is better than placebo or an alternative treatment, whether lifespan/healthspan is lengthened) than with understanding (e.g. whether we actually know the biology going on). Deeper understanding is great, and can itself ultimately lead to improvements in outcome, but outcome is in itself immediately useful and therefore prioritized in many contexts. Indeed there are many layers to this, combined with the "messiness" of a non-hard science...
The messiness of biology I think serves to blur some of the clearer lines that might exist in the hard sciences. In particular, biology contains essentially an infinite number of 'truths', but only a tiny amount of these truths are relevant to human health (in a practical sense). Furthermore, it is relatively common for a researcher to stumble upon a very practical result without having a clue of its theoretical underpinnings. Allow me to expand on that a bit...
What I mean by infinite 'truths' is something like this: Let's say that you are a vision researcher, and the benefit to society you hope to provide (i.e. how you 'sell' your grants when you try to fund your research) is to "figure out how vision works". Strike that: no grant written like that would be funded, it's too generic... A better, narrower phrasing would be something like: "figure out protein X's role in human primary congenital glaucoma". Let's say that the way you want to set about studying this is that you have developed a mouse mutant model whereby you have genetically replaced the mouse's version of gene X (that codes the protein) with a human version of gene X (that codes a defective protein related to the glaucoma in humans). Let's say that, after many years of research, you discovered exactly what is going on in your mouse mutant model. Have you figured out a truth? Yes. A universal one? A useful one? This is quite tricky to answer. It may be the case that what is going on in humans is very similar to what happens in the mouse. Might even be identical. This is the hoped-for endgame of so-called "translational" or "bench-to-bedside" research. But sometimes the results don't translate. You just know a neat fact about glaucoma generation in an unnatural, non-human organism. And there are infinite neat little facts in biology just like this. Every organism is its own little world, and though there are indeed universal 'truths' that seem to apply across the tree of life, those 'truths' are way to higher-order to provide much insight into specific human health issues. I can't perfectly articulate why I think that these remote-from-human biological truths are less worthwhile or useful to know than a similarly narrow physics truth...but I do. Maybe it's because physics operates across time and space in the universe in a way that biology does not. (Biology somewhere else may be different; biology in the past/future may be different). Maybe physics is just more closely grounded to...something?...than biology.
The opposite also happens somewhat frequently, which is that--by dumb luck--some incredibly useful discovery is made. Solutions get mixed up or applied incorrectly, or a battery of thousands of random chemicals are fired at the problem like a shotgun, and viola: compound Y is incredibly good at taking out a certain kind of cancer cell. We don't have a clue why compound Y does this, but we tested the hell out of it and we are very sure that it reproducibly does. (The why experiments come later after writing a grant. Sometimes the funding is completely backwards this way.) Sometimes this kind of approach is derisively called a "fishing expedition", and from a certain statistical standpoint, it is kind of a logical nightmare (e.g. correcting for multiple comparisons). And yet, it does sometimes work to great effect (that is, to great practical benefit of human health). There are other large-scale, very expensive biomedical projects that are carried out enthusiastically without specific, identified goals... like projects to exhaustively map the human brain, or (decades ago) to map the human genome. These projects are purely descriptive in their aims.
I'm of two minds about the ROI argument. I thought a lot about it as a post-doc and my conclusion had a non-trivial role in my leaving the field. I think the degree of hardness of the science matters a great deal here. Whereas I don't think biological truths are any less objectively true...I do think the lack of ease in (generalizing them)/(practical relevance)/(combinatorial complexity) undercuts the ROI argument substantially in softer sciences. As @JnG mentioned above, I got a certain "more (research) for the sake of more (research)" vibe with a lot of research which butted up against my growing understanding of the costs (energy, resources, etc.) of doing such research. One particular colleague I remember having conversations with about this strongly agreed with "doing science for the sake of science".jacob wrote: ↑Thu Jan 30, 2025 9:45 amAt this point, modern science is definitely playing the very long game... not the next quarter bottom line. It should, however, also be noted that science is a very cheap investment compared to what society gets from it. For example, it's been estimated that classical electrodynamics is responsible for something like 25% of the GDP of any modern nation. That's a lot of value originating from the minds of what was but a handful of geniuses whose compensation at the time was very small.
Agree, although my observation from a softer field is that certain teachers/students certainly do have a "hand down the facts" orientation. But then, 1) the bulk of students in lower-level biology courses are 'pre-med', and doctors are essentially the engineer-equivalent of biology, and 2) there are just so many damn facts to know in biology before even getting to basic, conserved processes, 'rote' is often used by both teachers and students as a way of simply managing/surviving the volume until it becomes more relevant (much) further down the line. Consider all the little factoids and definitions needed before an explanation of e.g. mitosis is even remotely realistic and not just some cartoon diagram...jacob wrote: ↑Thu Jan 30, 2025 9:45 amScientists are modernists to the core. Scientists, therefore, do not teach about truth in the "handed down facts" sense of traditionalism. Instead, science is teaching the process of using reason (theory and experiment) in pursuit of an objective truth. This is very different from the engineer or the technician, who just needs a number to plug into their design or machine. They could in principle obtain that from a numeric table in a giant book (like the Machinist's Bible) w/o having any understanding of how those numbers connect with each other. As long as the number works, the engineering is good.
In biomedical research, "more useful" usually implies "better" to the doctor. Again, "better" here is based on outcome rather than understanding for probably most in this field. And, if my cursory AI-answered googling is any indication, there are many more biomedical/"semi-hard" scientists in the US than there are physicists, or chemists, or mathematicians. Which isn't to argue against the point, just that...jacob wrote: ↑Thu Jan 30, 2025 9:45 amNote, though, that "better" doesn't imply "more useful" to the engineer. Nobody uses quantum electrodynamics to determine the design specs for the power transformer they're designing even if QED is one of the closest models of reality that human's know. Using QED instead of Maxwell's laws for transformer design is overkill to the point of being ridiculous. Classical ED is good enough for many applications. This is why it's still taught to engineers. Conversely, it is taught to scientists (in their junior year) to show how to build better and better models of reality. Learning QED is still the domain of 4th year physics masochists who are beginning to specialize and branch out (I was one). I'm almost certain that most electrical engineers would never be able to pass that course ... but I also know that they don't need to either. String theory is even harder requiring some 8 years of concentrated study before reaching the starting line.
(italics mine)jacob wrote: ↑Wed Jan 29, 2025 7:23 pmThe differences between the three *isms are sufficiently large to warrant the split in classification. Most people only ever spend time in one of these bubbles and so their respective *ism basically becomes the water they swim in to the point where they are not aware of it. They will in turn judge people from other bubbles based on their personal values rather than the values of the bubble the person inhabits.
I feel fairly confident that most of my laboratory colleagues (grad students, post-docs, and staff scientists) would not be well acquainted with Popper or really any of the philosophical aspects of science/epistemology. Which is to say, most scientists probably are not well acquainted. I'd argue that the way a lot of scientists themselves operate (probably depending on the field, hardness, etc.) is often a blend of these *isms, to say nothing about whether there is a kind of mental 'compartmentalization' in their lives between how they think at their job and how they think while at home or in the community or at the mall on Black Friday. They bring 'thought baggage' into the laboratory; they still human hard. They may certainly be operating in modernist mode a much larger percentage of the time, though. One way to frame that, though, is to say that a good number of scientists aren't really 'scientists', or at least aren't acting like one a lot of the time, which could be a fair characterization.
It's kind of interesting to consider a kind of knowledge "event horizon" in the sciences, which is to say that a scientist would, over time, have to spend a progressively greater fraction of their career simply learning background information before being able to meaningfully contribute something new. That kind of limitation wouldn't not seem to exist with 'personal truths', though.