brute simply MUST be right.
Yeah. I have noticed a pattern (now that I'm looking for it) among my friends. We all have a strong preference for definition. We want to talk about things, often not present, and sharing a definition makes this possible.
And it is implied in our communication, that more definition would be better. If concepts we're more clearly defined, we could communicate better. And among ourselves, this is true.
But when I watch n types, they are much more interested in ambiguity. In breaking definitions, to make their own uses of them. Until I read the SSC post about it, I never considered the good, logical reasons for wanting and using ambiguity.
So taking that backwards, how did we diverge? Where did I develope such a strong preference for definition and defined complexity of ideas, while everyone else followed a different path?
I think this goes back to late elementary school, and middle School. While I was playing D&D, and talking about game rules (I was a munchkin early); other kids were learning to use ambiguity to skirt around the rules. And learning to pass messages in public with their own codes. To communicate among themselves, while on the surface, communicating a different message to others.
Clarice quoted that great Scott Adams line, above, but I think the problem is deeper than that.
I think most geeks had very interesting distractions at this point in our lives, and we missed the games other kids were playing. By the time we realized that there WAS a game, it was because we were being declared the losers of the game, and the rules were ambiguous.
The reason I found kagen's model to not be what I was looking for, is I know how I think. I remember the limits of level 4, but I can't imagine how a level 3 can function as an adult. But I'm interested in what other people are thinking and how, in order to improve my own communication. Simply making a scale, and putting myself on the top is... counterproductive. And this is very common in scholarly approaches.
So what I am trying to reach for is what n types are thinking about. What they care about, and how they can hold these contradictions in their heads, and still function.
How can they say they think X, and when it is pointed out that X leads to Y, everytime; they can still support X, and condemn Y.
And I think it has something to do with this ambiguity/definition preference. I have a few ideas of how this could work.
Social signalling: n type doesn't really care about X or Y, merely that the right signals are given. When the group starts to change, preference for X or Y changes along with the goals of the n type, depending on how that n type perceives her place in the group, and potential changes to it.
Ambiguity: by simply avoiding defined, complex thoughts, the X leads to Y line of causal thinking is just underdeveloped. So me saying X leads to Y with certainty and examples, is no more likely to be accurate that the barista telling her to "have a great day!" (Which would certainly not make her any more blind to the truth than I am.)
And one of the key differences is in how we think we must be right. If a good, solid case can be made that I am wrong, I tend to correct my model, and go on with my day with a smile on my face. A great thing just happened.
But there are others who react quite differently. And I think that difference lies in how much we believe that truth is internal or external. If truth is external, and defined, getting a chance to more correctly align myself with it feels good. But if truth is something one holds inside oneself, everywhere the outside world is wrong, just feels more wrong. And someone making a solid case that one is wrong isn't a chance to realign and self correct, it is an attack on one's personal truth.
And holding truths inside, seems to be a function of this preference for ambiguity.
Or maybe I am wrong.