>Free will is demonstrated when you make a decision and act on it.
>Your decision is determined by how you value the assumed outcome of the decision.
>Your opinion of the relative value of the outcome is determined by :
(a)your genetics/initial condition + (b)environmental influences on your condition.
Absent a third factor (soul?) I don't see where free will can be expressed. Even if you try to *prove* you have free will (by, for example, doing the opposite of your natural impulses) you still have to account for the origin of your desire to do so.
The One where Riggerjack schools brute on Free Will
-
ThisDinosaur
- Posts: 997
- Joined: Fri Jul 17, 2015 9:31 am
Re: The One where Riggerjack schools brute on Free Will
It is my understanding that the brain processes information about future me in the same manner, or at the same level, that it processes information about others. Therefore, I would suggest that the concept of the self possessing free will may be consequent to the assumption that others possess free will. IOW, considering,planning and then carrying out behavior that will influence the state of future me seems like a higher level function than responding in the moment to the behavior of others based on the assumption that they have free will, but it only needs the same underlying building blocks to exist.
For example, I am a primitive creature trying to find some food, and I observe a boulder rolling down the hill towards me in one direction, and a sharp-toothed predator coming towards me from the other direction. It would be helpful to my survival to recognize that the rock does not possess something like "free movement", but the predator does. Then all I have to do is have a concept of self, and recognize that I am more like the predator than the rock to also assign "free movement" to myself. Add the concept of the future to my bag of tricks, and I can also assign "free movement" to future me.
Anyways, this is my theory based on observations of human infants attempting various tasks with poorly developed motor skills, but powered by huge amounts of WANT!WANT!WANT! in the moment. For instance, I highly doubt that my son at the age of 10 months was able to form a thoughtful intention along the lines of:
"They think they can keep me caged in this prison of a crib just because I am yet unable to stand firmly upon these weak chubby legs, but they are wrong!! MY PLAN FOR THE BENEFIT OF FUTURE ME:
1) Continue to scream, because the soft, leaky one might cave and come to the rescue.
2) Stretch, stretch, stretch until top bar can be grasped.
3) Heave, heave, heave. Do not give up although the damned cloth diaper is heavy.
4) Roll! Roll! Roll! Right over the edge.
5) Attempt safe landing upon cushioned bottom rather than soft head.
6) Freedom!
7) Exhibit gumless grin of victory when the soft-leaky one arrives at the door."
However, it still appeared to me that he was in possession of free will and to an even greater extent than the soft-tired-leaky one.
For example, I am a primitive creature trying to find some food, and I observe a boulder rolling down the hill towards me in one direction, and a sharp-toothed predator coming towards me from the other direction. It would be helpful to my survival to recognize that the rock does not possess something like "free movement", but the predator does. Then all I have to do is have a concept of self, and recognize that I am more like the predator than the rock to also assign "free movement" to myself. Add the concept of the future to my bag of tricks, and I can also assign "free movement" to future me.
Anyways, this is my theory based on observations of human infants attempting various tasks with poorly developed motor skills, but powered by huge amounts of WANT!WANT!WANT! in the moment. For instance, I highly doubt that my son at the age of 10 months was able to form a thoughtful intention along the lines of:
"They think they can keep me caged in this prison of a crib just because I am yet unable to stand firmly upon these weak chubby legs, but they are wrong!! MY PLAN FOR THE BENEFIT OF FUTURE ME:
1) Continue to scream, because the soft, leaky one might cave and come to the rescue.
2) Stretch, stretch, stretch until top bar can be grasped.
3) Heave, heave, heave. Do not give up although the damned cloth diaper is heavy.
4) Roll! Roll! Roll! Right over the edge.
5) Attempt safe landing upon cushioned bottom rather than soft head.
6) Freedom!
7) Exhibit gumless grin of victory when the soft-leaky one arrives at the door."
However, it still appeared to me that he was in possession of free will and to an even greater extent than the soft-tired-leaky one.
-
Spartan_Warrior
- Posts: 1659
- Joined: Fri Dec 02, 2011 1:24 am
Re: The One where Riggerjack schools brute on Free Will
@BRUTE: I must admit I haven't read every article in this thread nor am I very familiar with the term "emergence" and all its meanings. My understanding is that emergence in this context refers to the fact that consciousness (which is the reason we experience the sense of "free will") is an emergent property from the physical systems of the brain/body. "Strong emergence" appears to imply that an emergent property like consciousness is able to exert "direct causal action on its components". Thus, the consciousness is able to exert influence on the brain/body. Ta-da, free will! Right...?
I don't have any particular stance on that except to agree with Mark Bedau from the Wiki article in that it seems like a very strange, "magical" sort of causation. It goes against my layman's understanding of causality, as it appears to require an interaction between physical substances (brain/body) and the non-physical emergent substance, whereas causality to my knowledge is exclusively between physical substances.
Bottom line, no, I don't believe the concept of emergence is necessary either way for the distinction I draw between determinism and fatalism. (That's not to say emergence is impossible or irrelevant to the discussion as a whole.) Again, I think the distinction is logically entailed simply by the definitions of determinism and fatalism.
The fatalist says, "It doesn't matter what I do today, the future is set." The determinist says, "What I do today is (partly) what determines the future."
Now, what's troubling you is the fact that "What I do today" is also determined. Note that I'm not arguing against that. I am not saying, "I am free to choose what I do today." Nor is free will at all required for what I do today to (partly) determine the future.
It's hard to explain, but I almost find determinism to be an empowering, if not "freeing", belief. Granted, I didn't choose who I am. I don't get to influence the causal laws that brought me to the present state of things. I didn't shape the factors that influence the way I make decisions. Et cetera. And yet, my unique life path brought me to enough knowledge to understand the concept of determinism, which says that preceding events combined with physical laws combine to cause the future. From this it also occurs to me that the events of today are the preceding events of tomorrow. So, to the extent that it occurs to me to make decisions (System 2 thinking?), I should make those decisions that I suspect will most likely cause the future outcomes I desire.
Perhaps this is the best way I can put it. Suppose I want to compete in a triathlon. In a metaphysical sense, I didn't choose this desire. Through deterministic causality, the prior events of my life led me to this particular desire. As it happens, the prior events in my life also converged such that, at approximately eleven o'clock today, the physical structure of my brain becomes arranged such that I experience the conscious thought, "Hey, should I train for the triathlon today?" Thanks to my knowledge of determinism, ironically arrived at through deterministic processes, I am aware that if I don't train today, I may never compete in that triathlon in the future. Because that's how causality works.
Thus, my belief in determinism actually motivates me more to take control of the causal inputs of my life to whatever extent possible. Even if that control turns out to be illusory, the causal inputs themselves are not.
I think there are probably different levels or layers of "control/agency" and even "choice", for that matter. Perhaps these concepts should also be distinct from the metaphysical idea of "Free Will".
Perhaps this is all just incoherent compatibilist nonsense, but it seems to work for me. By the way, this distinction strikes me as most useful in combating the "appeal to consequences" argument. I don't believe fatalism, which to me is that particular sense of existential helplessness to play any role in one's own future, is necessarily entailed by determinism, and certainly not synonymous with it.
I don't have any particular stance on that except to agree with Mark Bedau from the Wiki article in that it seems like a very strange, "magical" sort of causation. It goes against my layman's understanding of causality, as it appears to require an interaction between physical substances (brain/body) and the non-physical emergent substance, whereas causality to my knowledge is exclusively between physical substances.
Bottom line, no, I don't believe the concept of emergence is necessary either way for the distinction I draw between determinism and fatalism. (That's not to say emergence is impossible or irrelevant to the discussion as a whole.) Again, I think the distinction is logically entailed simply by the definitions of determinism and fatalism.
The fatalist says, "It doesn't matter what I do today, the future is set." The determinist says, "What I do today is (partly) what determines the future."
Now, what's troubling you is the fact that "What I do today" is also determined. Note that I'm not arguing against that. I am not saying, "I am free to choose what I do today." Nor is free will at all required for what I do today to (partly) determine the future.
It's hard to explain, but I almost find determinism to be an empowering, if not "freeing", belief. Granted, I didn't choose who I am. I don't get to influence the causal laws that brought me to the present state of things. I didn't shape the factors that influence the way I make decisions. Et cetera. And yet, my unique life path brought me to enough knowledge to understand the concept of determinism, which says that preceding events combined with physical laws combine to cause the future. From this it also occurs to me that the events of today are the preceding events of tomorrow. So, to the extent that it occurs to me to make decisions (System 2 thinking?), I should make those decisions that I suspect will most likely cause the future outcomes I desire.
Perhaps this is the best way I can put it. Suppose I want to compete in a triathlon. In a metaphysical sense, I didn't choose this desire. Through deterministic causality, the prior events of my life led me to this particular desire. As it happens, the prior events in my life also converged such that, at approximately eleven o'clock today, the physical structure of my brain becomes arranged such that I experience the conscious thought, "Hey, should I train for the triathlon today?" Thanks to my knowledge of determinism, ironically arrived at through deterministic processes, I am aware that if I don't train today, I may never compete in that triathlon in the future. Because that's how causality works.
Thus, my belief in determinism actually motivates me more to take control of the causal inputs of my life to whatever extent possible. Even if that control turns out to be illusory, the causal inputs themselves are not.
I think there are probably different levels or layers of "control/agency" and even "choice", for that matter. Perhaps these concepts should also be distinct from the metaphysical idea of "Free Will".
Perhaps this is all just incoherent compatibilist nonsense, but it seems to work for me. By the way, this distinction strikes me as most useful in combating the "appeal to consequences" argument. I don't believe fatalism, which to me is that particular sense of existential helplessness to play any role in one's own future, is necessarily entailed by determinism, and certainly not synonymous with it.
Re: The One where Riggerjack schools brute on Free Will
brute agrees 100%. this is actually an important tenet of Dennett's theory of consciousness. he says that humans have likely developed the idea that they themselves are conscious from the observation that other animals (and humans) seem conscious.7Wannabe5 wrote:I would suggest that the concept of the self possessing free will may be consequent to the assumption that others possess free will.
brute likes to describes this phenomenon as humans anthropomorphizing each other, and then themselves.
let brute rephrase the debate about "the illusion of free will" a bit.
maybe the illusion isn't the "free will" (i.e. the choice being made), as much as the alternative options? humans experience free will because they saw a number of options, and they only acted upon one of them. but did they really have a choice? could a human who dislikes vanilla really have chosen the vanilla ice cream? it certainly seems to this human that he could have, but (in this case, biological/psychological rather than atomic) determinism says he could not.
if a human is faced with x options in any given situation, and experiences himself, half consciously and half subconsciously, dismissing one option after another until only one is left and "chosen", this decision making process could be considered the expression of the "free will". but these types of decisions are made by plenty of entities that humans usually consider not to have free will - for example, computer programs.
Re: The One where Riggerjack schools brute on Free Will
@Spartan_Warrior:
brute is also new to the whole emergence thing. the aspect of "strong emergence" he meant was that it's not easily possible to simulate/tell the effects.
i.e. the emergence of a stomach ache after eating a wide variety of hamburgers is easy to determine beforehand (silly example of weak emergence). but the biological design of an animal brute knows to be built out of carbon atoms is much more complicated, if not impossible, to predict/simulate.
for the record, brute also finds determinism very freeing in a sense. brute thinks there's a type of individual that finds "understanding" relaxing and freeing. maybe because it displays a level of control over the environment. every time brute understands something, he starts to feel good about this domain, even if his physical situation didn't at all change.
one more attempt at understanding Determinism vs. Fatalism:
determinist: knows that his performance in triathlon will be the sum of effects his training has had
fatalist: knows that he will win the triathlon, so he doesn't even train
or: determinism says the future will be a function of the present, but doesn't say how that future will look (emergence). fatalism says the future will look a certain way, no matter how the present or any in-between state will look like. insofar, the two really are incompatible unless one has an emergence-predicting crystal ball.
brute is also new to the whole emergence thing. the aspect of "strong emergence" he meant was that it's not easily possible to simulate/tell the effects.
i.e. the emergence of a stomach ache after eating a wide variety of hamburgers is easy to determine beforehand (silly example of weak emergence). but the biological design of an animal brute knows to be built out of carbon atoms is much more complicated, if not impossible, to predict/simulate.
for the record, brute also finds determinism very freeing in a sense. brute thinks there's a type of individual that finds "understanding" relaxing and freeing. maybe because it displays a level of control over the environment. every time brute understands something, he starts to feel good about this domain, even if his physical situation didn't at all change.
one more attempt at understanding Determinism vs. Fatalism:
determinist: knows that his performance in triathlon will be the sum of effects his training has had
fatalist: knows that he will win the triathlon, so he doesn't even train
or: determinism says the future will be a function of the present, but doesn't say how that future will look (emergence). fatalism says the future will look a certain way, no matter how the present or any in-between state will look like. insofar, the two really are incompatible unless one has an emergence-predicting crystal ball.
-
Spartan_Warrior
- Posts: 1659
- Joined: Fri Dec 02, 2011 1:24 am
Re: The One where Riggerjack schools brute on Free Will
@BRUTE: "determinist: knows that his performance in triathlon will be the sum of effects his training has had
fatalist: knows that he will win the triathlon, so he doesn't even train"
Essentially, yes, something like that. I would add a little more nuance, like the determinist knows his performance in the triathlon will be the result of multiple chains of causal events that include such events/inputs as his own training, nutrition, inborn talent, etc. But yes, the essential difference I see is that determinism is focused on physical causality's role in events, while fatalism is focused on a future that is pre-determined--and that's all; no real attention paid to causality, so implicitly its role in the future is downplayed.
Since we as humans cannot know the future, nor are we currently capable of visualizing or simulating all physical laws and event states that go into creating the future (I gather this is what you mean by emergence), fatalism is an incoherent position. However, if determinism is true and we could know all those inputs, fatalism then would become necessary. See Dr. Manhattan. https://mrlivermore.wordpress.com/2010/ ... free-will/
Interesting you would choose a positive fate for the fatalist example. Fatalism has a connotation with an assumed "negative" outcome, but that's certainly not a necessary component. Indeed, religious belief in a glorious end-time or Rapture are also a brand of fatalistic thinking.
fatalist: knows that he will win the triathlon, so he doesn't even train"
Essentially, yes, something like that. I would add a little more nuance, like the determinist knows his performance in the triathlon will be the result of multiple chains of causal events that include such events/inputs as his own training, nutrition, inborn talent, etc. But yes, the essential difference I see is that determinism is focused on physical causality's role in events, while fatalism is focused on a future that is pre-determined--and that's all; no real attention paid to causality, so implicitly its role in the future is downplayed.
Since we as humans cannot know the future, nor are we currently capable of visualizing or simulating all physical laws and event states that go into creating the future (I gather this is what you mean by emergence), fatalism is an incoherent position. However, if determinism is true and we could know all those inputs, fatalism then would become necessary. See Dr. Manhattan. https://mrlivermore.wordpress.com/2010/ ... free-will/
Interesting you would choose a positive fate for the fatalist example. Fatalism has a connotation with an assumed "negative" outcome, but that's certainly not a necessary component. Indeed, religious belief in a glorious end-time or Rapture are also a brand of fatalistic thinking.
Re: The One where Riggerjack schools brute on Free Will
sweet. brute thinks he now understands the difference. it's all in the unknowable emergence, baby 
Re: The One where Riggerjack schools brute on Free Will
Yes, exactly. This the so-called "theory of mind" that we are all born with, and is also an emergent property of the human brain. We innately attribute agency to virtually everything that moves, even objects. (Its only later that we learn that some things have more agency than others.) Then we soon realize that everybody else views us in the same way. Or most of us do, anyway.BRUTE wrote:brute agrees 100%. this is actually an important tenet of Dennett's theory of consciousness. he says that humans have likely developed the idea that they themselves are conscious from the observation that other animals (and humans) seem conscious.7Wannabe5 wrote:I would suggest that the concept of the self possessing free will may be consequent to the assumption that others possess free will.
brute likes to describes this phenomenon as humans anthropomorphizing each other, and then themselves.
It's funny -- in a way its like money, or money follows the same concept. The main reason we value it is because we know/believe that other people value it.
One might say that free will is the currency of human social interaction, which is minted by the theory of mind.
Re: The One where Riggerjack schools brute on Free Will
We feel as if our eyes provide a coherent view of the world but in reality we have a rather large blind spot that is caused by the optic nerve passing through the optic disc. Our brains interpolate the image that surrounds the blind spot and fills in the void to make us believe we have a coherent view.BRUTE wrote: @Ego:
coming from the other side here, brute could look at it this way: there is an experience that almost all humans have and mostly agree upon, and they call it free will. so far, no quantum woo.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blind_spot_(vision)
Arguing for free-will is very similar to arguing that despite evidence to the contrary, we see a real, coherent picture. Saying we have free-will is like saying our brains do not fill in the void.
With free-will, there is quite a lot of evidence of a postdictive illusion that we don't even notice. Our brain creates a coherent picture of our place in the world. Underneath the surface our conscious brain concocts a story (creates the picture) after the fact to explain why the sub-conscious brain did what it did. Our conscious mind does not control what happens, it explains what happens. Saying otherwise is like saying the eyeballs you are using to read this are seeing the whole picture.
http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/min ... free-will/
We are now just scratching the surface on how our experiences shape our perceptions of reality. For instance, I heard this story yesterday and it blew my mind.
http://www.radiolab.org/story/211213-sky-isnt-blue/
Re: The One where Riggerjack schools brute on Free Will
sure, that's exactly Dennett's "multiple drafts" theory (==brain makes shit up along the way).
maybe humans who believe in free will are reverse-fatalists. instead of believing that no matter what they do, X will happen, they think that because they can't 100% predict/model what they'll do, it must not be deterministic. both groups discount emergence.
maybe humans who believe in free will are reverse-fatalists. instead of believing that no matter what they do, X will happen, they think that because they can't 100% predict/model what they'll do, it must not be deterministic. both groups discount emergence.
Re: The One where Riggerjack schools brute on Free Will
A lot of the confusion with determinism/free-will lies in the fact that different people are using different definitions so It would probably be helpful if you were to define what you mean when you say emergence.BRUTE wrote:both groups discount emergence.
-
Riggerjack
- Posts: 3191
- Joined: Thu Jul 14, 2011 3:09 am
Re: The One where Riggerjack schools brute on Free Will
"For instance, I heard this story yesterday and it blew my mind.
http://www.radiolab.org/story/211213-sky-isnt-blue/"
Taleb brought this up in antifragile, relating details of color being less important in an action based culture. That being the reason for lack of words for colors in early languages.
Back to the topic, I seem to be missing some key elements of these mental models.
Some seem to feel that the universe is deterministic, and since we don't have a sufficient model, we can't predict the future. But the only thing stopping us from such a perfect prediction is lack of an appropriate model. There seems to be some contradiction in whether we have choice or not in these models. Ego seems to be the only one who believes choice is illusion.
Have I got that right?
http://www.radiolab.org/story/211213-sky-isnt-blue/"
Taleb brought this up in antifragile, relating details of color being less important in an action based culture. That being the reason for lack of words for colors in early languages.
Back to the topic, I seem to be missing some key elements of these mental models.
Some seem to feel that the universe is deterministic, and since we don't have a sufficient model, we can't predict the future. But the only thing stopping us from such a perfect prediction is lack of an appropriate model. There seems to be some contradiction in whether we have choice or not in these models. Ego seems to be the only one who believes choice is illusion.
Have I got that right?
-
Riggerjack
- Posts: 3191
- Joined: Thu Jul 14, 2011 3:09 am
Re: The One where Riggerjack schools brute on Free Will
Now, the primary argument for all this is physics, plus a study showing discordance in what influence conscious has on decisions.
I don't recognize the discordance. If the decision happens, then the sportscaster makes up the story afterward, that hardly matters. What MATTERS is the storyline. From identical experiences, completely different reactions can happen. Post traumatic stress vs post traumatic growth from the same battle being an excellent example.
Now, there are those who will say that one guy was just programmed to react better to traumatic stress. I agree, but I also believe we program ourselves.
Look, we know all our thoughts are just the firing of neurons. And we know that the more our brains practice a pattern, the more ingrained that pattern. This leads to all our proclivities.
I believe we have the ability to choose our reactions, that we choose the bias of the sportscaster, however you want to put it. That choice then feeds back into the subconscious decision making process. Thus the conscious choice influences future choices.
I believe my choices are mine.
Now, I could be wrong, and choice could be an illusion. A trick of the mind, like Ego's analogy of the eye. The universe could operate like an elaborate clockwork, and me finding and marrying my wife was predictable from the big bang.
But I don't buy it, and the science doesn't support it.
I don't recognize the discordance. If the decision happens, then the sportscaster makes up the story afterward, that hardly matters. What MATTERS is the storyline. From identical experiences, completely different reactions can happen. Post traumatic stress vs post traumatic growth from the same battle being an excellent example.
Now, there are those who will say that one guy was just programmed to react better to traumatic stress. I agree, but I also believe we program ourselves.
Look, we know all our thoughts are just the firing of neurons. And we know that the more our brains practice a pattern, the more ingrained that pattern. This leads to all our proclivities.
I believe we have the ability to choose our reactions, that we choose the bias of the sportscaster, however you want to put it. That choice then feeds back into the subconscious decision making process. Thus the conscious choice influences future choices.
I believe my choices are mine.
Now, I could be wrong, and choice could be an illusion. A trick of the mind, like Ego's analogy of the eye. The universe could operate like an elaborate clockwork, and me finding and marrying my wife was predictable from the big bang.
But I don't buy it, and the science doesn't support it.
Re: The One where Riggerjack schools brute on Free Will
Do people who believe in free will think animals or other simpler organisms have free will? If not, why are humans different? It seems clear to me that ants follow programmed actions in response to environmental stimuli. I admit the human comparison is much more complex, but I see it different in degree, not kind. Presence of mind does not diminish this in my opinion. Having a mental dialogue is part of how humans process their environment.
Free will seems a narrative that is emotionally pleasing ("I have a say"), but I just don't see a strong argument for it. Saying "I feel it" isn't enough for me, since this presumes we have 100% awareness and control of our thoughts/mental activity, which is almost certainly false.
Free will seems a narrative that is emotionally pleasing ("I have a say"), but I just don't see a strong argument for it. Saying "I feel it" isn't enough for me, since this presumes we have 100% awareness and control of our thoughts/mental activity, which is almost certainly false.
-
batbatmanne
- Posts: 33
- Joined: Fri Sep 19, 2014 10:35 pm
Re: The One where Riggerjack schools brute on Free Will
The standard positions on free will that I am familiar with are the libertarians, soft determinists and hard determinists. The soft/hard distinction is in regard to the issue of what is called compatibilism. Compatibilism is basically the question of whether "free will" is conceptually compatible with determinism. A libertarian accepts free will and rejects compatibilism. As a consequence the libertarian will reject determinism in what I interpret to be a stupifyingly anti-empiricist argument. They might attempt to use a particular metatheoretic interpretation of quantum mechanics that supports metaphysical probabilism to bolster their view, although of course it is worth considering that a probabilistic universe might be just as incompatible with free will as determinism. I don't think that this view is very popular among philosophers although I haven't looked at any statistics on the matter.
It seems to me that the nuts and bolts of the issue has to do with finding a more coherent definition of free will and therefore with the possibility for compatibilism. A soft determinist believes that determinism is compatible with free will. This view was popularized by Hume, who argued for a compatibilist view (see the SEP entry). The hard determinist is an incompatibilist just like the libertarian but instead makes the reverse argument: the world is deterministic and compatibilism is false therefore there is no free will.
I have found myself firmly in the soft determinist camp ever since first becoming familiar with the terrain. My view is largely deflationist in character. In a secular society it seems most plausible to me to say that to have free will is to be an agent: it is the ability to reliably assess the consequences of different actions made under the same circumstances and to then to act in light of this information. There is no prima facie reason to think that this conflicts with determinism.
The philosophical problems come up when we attempt to reduce our choices to a series of physiological interactions. The reductionist claims that we have not made a "free" choice because our actions can be explained solely with reference to our previous physiological states and environmental (sensory) input. By conceiving the event in this way we are struck with the inevitability of our choice and so are led to believe that the behavior could not be considered freely chosen. I think this response by the reductionist is just as convincing as being told that a log of wood is not on fire but rather that there are so many oxygen particles in the air that are interacting with the particles in the log in the way described by the chemical process of combustion--this is just what it means to say the log of wood is on fire, there need not be any mysteries here unless you think that the term 'fire' has special metaphysical status. In the case of free will there is a long history in Western philosophy and religion of ascribing a special metaphysical status, but I argue that it is conceptually unnecessary.
It seems to me that the nuts and bolts of the issue has to do with finding a more coherent definition of free will and therefore with the possibility for compatibilism. A soft determinist believes that determinism is compatible with free will. This view was popularized by Hume, who argued for a compatibilist view (see the SEP entry). The hard determinist is an incompatibilist just like the libertarian but instead makes the reverse argument: the world is deterministic and compatibilism is false therefore there is no free will.
I have found myself firmly in the soft determinist camp ever since first becoming familiar with the terrain. My view is largely deflationist in character. In a secular society it seems most plausible to me to say that to have free will is to be an agent: it is the ability to reliably assess the consequences of different actions made under the same circumstances and to then to act in light of this information. There is no prima facie reason to think that this conflicts with determinism.
The philosophical problems come up when we attempt to reduce our choices to a series of physiological interactions. The reductionist claims that we have not made a "free" choice because our actions can be explained solely with reference to our previous physiological states and environmental (sensory) input. By conceiving the event in this way we are struck with the inevitability of our choice and so are led to believe that the behavior could not be considered freely chosen. I think this response by the reductionist is just as convincing as being told that a log of wood is not on fire but rather that there are so many oxygen particles in the air that are interacting with the particles in the log in the way described by the chemical process of combustion--this is just what it means to say the log of wood is on fire, there need not be any mysteries here unless you think that the term 'fire' has special metaphysical status. In the case of free will there is a long history in Western philosophy and religion of ascribing a special metaphysical status, but I argue that it is conceptually unnecessary.
Re: The One where Riggerjack schools brute on Free Will
clockwork yes, predictable no. that's the emergence part.Riggerjack wrote:The universe could operate like an elaborate clockwork, and me finding and marrying my wife was predictable from the big bang.
as Riggerjack can tell, brute also believes choice is an illusion.
Re: The One where Riggerjack schools brute on Free Will
In his talk and book on free will Harris did an interesting mental exercise to show why the choice is certainly made by "you", but the part of you making the choice is your unconscious mind which your conscious mind does not control.Riggerjack wrote: I believe we have the ability to choose our reactions, that we choose the bias of the sportscaster, however you want to put it. That choice then feeds back into the subconscious decision making process. Thus the conscious choice influences future choices.
I believe my choices are mine.
(runs from 16:50 to about 25:15)
https://youtu.be/pCofmZlC72g?t=16m56s
I could be wrong, but I do NOT believe it is predictable. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_indeterminacyRiggerjack wrote:Now, I could be wrong, and choice could be an illusion. A trick of the mind, like Ego's analogy of the eye. The universe could operate like an elaborate clockwork, and me finding and marrying my wife was predictable from the big bang.
But I don't buy it, and the science doesn't support it.
This is where much of the confusion comes in..... the word determinism.
I believe I am the result of genes plus experience. If I am the result of those two inputs then any decision I make is based on them. When offered the opportunity to pick any city in the world, I would be unable to choose one that I did not know existed and I would be unable to understand why my sub-conscious mind spewed up the one it did.
Re: The One where Riggerjack schools brute on Free Will
talking of Harris, brute remembers agreeing with Dennett on consciousness/free will and disagreeing with Harris (in his book Wake Up). unfortunately, brute doesn't remember what their dispute was about, but brute thinks Harris is a compatibilist and Dennett isn't.
edit: brute is full of shit. he just looked it up, and apparently Dennett is the compatibilist. brute will investigate further.
edit: brute is full of shit. he just looked it up, and apparently Dennett is the compatibilist. brute will investigate further.
Re: The One where Riggerjack schools brute on Free Will
Dave wrote: If not, why are humans different? It seems clear to me that ants follow programmed actions in response to environmental stimuli. I admit the human comparison is much more complex, but I see it different in degree, not kind. Presence of mind does not diminish this in my opinion. Having a mental dialogue is part of how humans process their environment.
What humans have that animals do not possess in any significant manner, among other features, is the "theory of mind" feature discussed above. Yes, the neuroscience says that the human brain/mind is different from animal minds.
In my experience, this fact -- which was not confirmed until relatively recently -- causes a lot of cognitive dissonance because people still want to believe, or base other beliefs, on what was known as the "Big Brain Theory" that was thought to be correct from the 19th through the mid-20th Century, but was shown to be in error.
Here's the history of that research:
"During the 1960s, research was conducted to determine whether human brains were functionally different from animal brains or were just “bigger animal brains” as had been theorized since Darwin’s time – the so-called “Big Brain Theory.” The research revealed that human brains were in fact organized in fundamentally different ways from those of animals, even those most closely related. Based on that research, evolutionary biologist Charles Oxnard concluded: “The nature of human brain organization is very different from that of chimpanzees, which are themselves scarcely different from the other great apes and not too different even from Old World monkeys.” In other words, as the human brain evolved, it was not that additional skills are simply being added on as once was hypothesized under the Big Brain Theory, but that the whole brain was rearranged and reformulated in different ways.
Further subsequent research over the next 40 years revealed that the brain was formulated in a series of modules, with greater numbers of connected neurons within the modules and fewer connections between the modules. Neuroimaging studies show that these modules operate like parallel circuits that processing different inputs simultaneously. One part of the brain reacts when you hear words, another particular part of the brain reacts to seeing words, still another area reacts while speaking words, and they can all be going at the same time.
Figuring out the organization of the modules proved to be a devilishly difficult task. The brain is asymmetric, having a dominant half, which is usually the left brain in most people. Certain modules appear in both hemispheres, while other modules appear in only one. And they are not in the same place or of the exact same construction in every person. Moreover, the same structures in animals often act differently in the human brain, making scientists more wary of cross-species comparisons. Indeed, research in the past ten years has revealed that the neurons themselves may be different from species to species and perform different functions even if there are similarities in form. As Professor Gazzaniga relates it: “All neurons are not alike, and some types of neurons may be found only in specific species. Moreover, a given type of neuron may exhibit unique properties in a given species.” This called into question what could be concluded from much of the prior research that had only been conducted on animals."
Re: The One where Riggerjack schools brute on Free Will
I will take a shot at defining emergence.
Emergence: A qualitative change in the state of a complex, open system with defined boundary as input of energy increases or continues over time OR the description of the state of the region defined by the intersection of two previously boundary-defined complex systems OR the undetermined state of order or information in an open system over time.
IOW, the second law of thermodynamics states what will occur in a closed system over time (determined), but it does not and can not state what will occur in an open system over time (not determined), but the possibilities increase with the availability of energy for work. (Or something maybe vaguely like that. I am still too lazy to read "A Mathematical Theory of Communication" by Shannon.)
Emergence: A qualitative change in the state of a complex, open system with defined boundary as input of energy increases or continues over time OR the description of the state of the region defined by the intersection of two previously boundary-defined complex systems OR the undetermined state of order or information in an open system over time.
IOW, the second law of thermodynamics states what will occur in a closed system over time (determined), but it does not and can not state what will occur in an open system over time (not determined), but the possibilities increase with the availability of energy for work. (Or something maybe vaguely like that. I am still too lazy to read "A Mathematical Theory of Communication" by Shannon.)